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INTERNATIONAL LAW-EXTRADITION TREATIES-CRIMINAL
LAW-JURISDICTION-The United States Supreme Court has held
that a foreign national criminal defendant is subject to this coun-
try's court jurisdiction when that person is forcibly abducted and
brought to the United States from a country with which the
United States has an extradition treaty.
United States v Alvarez-Machain, US , 112 S Ct 2188 (1992).
Humberto Alvarez-Machain ("Alvarez") was indicted in the
United States for his participation in the abduction and murder of
United States Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") special
agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar ("Camarena") and Camarena's
pilot, Alfredo Zavala-Avelar. 1 Alvarez, who is a Mexican citizen
and resident, is a medical doctor whom the DEA believed aided in
prolonging Camarena's life during his torture and interrogation at
the hands of Mexican drug dealers in Mexico.2 On April 2, 1990,
Alvarez was arrested by DEA officers after being forcibly abducted
from his medical office in Mexico and transported by a private
plane to El Paso, Texas.' After Alvarez's arrest by DEA officials,
the United States Department of State received three diplomatic
notes from the Embassy of Mexico stating that it considered the
abduction a violation of the extradition treaty between the coun-
tries and demanded the return of Alvarez to Mexico.' In United
States v Caro-Quintero,5 the district court found that although
DEA officials did not directly participate in Alvarez's abduction
they were the parties responsible for the kidnapping.0
1. United States v Alvarez-Machain, US , 112 S Ct 2188, 2190 (1992). The in-
dictment contained the following charges: (1) violation of 18 USC §§ 371, 1959-conspiracy
to commit violent acts in furtherance of racketeering activity; (2) violation of 18 USC § 1959
(a) (2)-committing violent acts in furtherance of racketeering activities; (3) violation of 18
USC §§ 1201 (a) (5), 1201 (c)-conspiracy to kidnap a federal agent; (4) violation of 18 USC
§ 1201 (a) (5)-kidnap of a federal agent and (5) violation of 18 USC §§ 1111 (a), 1114-fel-
ony murder of a federal agent. Alvarez, 112 S Ct at 2190.
2. Alvarez, 112 S Ct at 2190.
3. Id. Alvarez testified that he was beaten by his abductors, injected with an un-
known substance and shocked several times with an electrical-shock apparatus. United
States v Caro-Quintero, 745 F Supp 599, 603 (CD Cal 1990).
4. Caro, 745 F Supp at 604.
5. Id at 599. Alvarez was tried along with other individuals who also allegedly par-
ticipated in Camarena's murder. Id.
6. Id at 602-04, 609.
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Alvarez challenged the validity of the indictment by filing a mo-
tion to dismiss. 7 First, Alvarez claimed that his kidnapping consti-
tuted outrageous governmental conduct, and also, since he was ab-
ducted in violation of the United States-Mexico extradition
treaty,8 the district court lacked jurisdiction necessary to try him
in the United States.9 The claim of outrageous governmental con-
duct was denied.10 Alvarez was discharged by the district court af-
ter it held that his abduction violated the Extradition Treaty and
therefore it lacked jurisdiction in the case."
The United States appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit. 2 In affirming the district court deci-
sion, the court of appeals relied on its decision in United States v
Verdugo-Urquidez.' In Verdugo, the court of appeals held that a
forcible abduction of a Mexican national from Mexico by United
States agents without the consent of the Mexican government was
a violation of the Extradition Treaty. 4 Verdugo acquired standing
to assert rights under the Extradition Treaty when Mexico pro-
tested the action in letters to the district court"8 and the court of
appeals held that the proper solution to remedy the violation was
dismissal of the indictment and repatriation of the Mexican na-
tional to Mexico.16
The court of appeals in the present case affirmed the findings of
the district court that there was United States involvement in the
abduction of Alvarez and that sufficient governmental protest was
provided by Mexico in its letters to the United States government
to constitute a violation of the Extradition Treaty.'7 In accordance
with the above-mentioned findings, the court of appeals dismissed
the indictment of Alvarez and ordered his immediate repatriation
7. Alvarez, 112 S Ct at 2190.
8. Extradition Treaty, [1979] 31 UST 5059, TIAS No 9656 (1978).
9. Alvarez, 112 S Ct at 2190.
10. Caro, 745 F Supp at 601. Although the court decided that Alvarez's "abductors
were paid agents of the United States, Dr. Machain's [Alvarez's] allegations of mistreat-
ment, even if taken as true, do not constitute acts of such barbarism as to warrant dismissal
of the indictment under the case law." Id at 605.
11. Id at 614.
12. United States v Alvarez-Machain, 946 F2d 1466 (9th Cir 1991). The case was
heard before Circuit Judges Goodwin and Schroeder, and District Judge King, District
Judge for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation. Alvarez, 946 F2d at 1466.
13. 939 F2d 1341 (9th Cir 1991).
14. Verdugo, 939 F2d at 1351-52.
15. Id at 1356.
16. Id at 1359.
17. Alvarez, 946 F2d at 1467.
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to Mexico."8 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
in the case.19
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the forcible
abduction of Alvarez with the authorization of the United States
government violated the Extradition Treaty between the United
States and Mexico thereby denying the district court jurisdiction
over Alvarez.2
The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision,2" reversed and re-
manded.22 Justice Rehnquist began by stating that the precise is-
sue raised in the present case had never been before the Court.2 3
The last case in which the Court considered this general area of
law was United States v Rauscher24 which held that when an indi-
vidual has been brought before the court's jurisdiction by an extra-
dition treaty, that person can only be tried for an offense listed in
the treaty and one which caused him to be extradited. 8 The Court
differentiated the present case from Rauscher due to the fact that
Alvarez was not brought before the United States courts by means
of the Extradition Treaty.26
The Court then cited Ker v Illinois" which held "forcible abduc-
tion was not a sufficient reason why the party should not answer
18. Id.
19. United States v Alvarez-Machain, US , 112 S Ct at 2191 (1992).
20. Alvarez, 112 S Ct at 2190.
21. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices White,
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. The dissent was written by Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor. Id.
22. Id at 2197. On December 14, 1992, United States District Court Judge Edward
Rafeedie dismissed the action on remand and acquitted Alvarez. United States v Caro-
Quintero, No CR87-422 (CD Cal, December 14, 1992). See also Don J. DeBenedictis, Scant
Evidence Frees Abducted Doctor, 79 ABA J 22 (February 1993). Judge Rafeedie, the same
District Court Judge who originally ruled the abduction violated the Extradition Treaty,
stated that the United States did not present adequate evidence against Alvarez for the case
to be tried before a jury. United States v Caro-Quintero, No CR87-422 (CD Cal,'December
14, 1992). See also DeBenedictis, Scant Evidence Frees Abducted Doctor, 79 ABA J at 22.
23. Alvarez, 112 S Ct at 2191.
24. 119 US 407 (1886). Rauscher involved the extradition of Rauscher in accordance
with the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842. Rauscher, 119 US at 410. The Court held that
Rauscher could not be tried for any crimes other than those for which he had been extra-
dited. Id at 430. This principle is also known as the doctrine of specialty. Alvarez, 112 S Ct
at 2200.
25. Rauscher, 119 US at 430.
26. Alvarez, 112 S Ct at 2191-92.
27. 119 US 436 (1886). Ker involved the forcible abduction of the defendant from
Peru and his subsequent transportation to the United States where he stood trial. Ker, 119
US at 438-39. The parties responsible for kidnapping Ker were in no way representatives of
or authorized by the U.S. government and the Extradition Treaty was not called into opera-
tion. Id at 443.
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when brought within the jurisdiction of the court which has the
right to try him for an offense, and presented no valid objection to
his trial in such court. '28 The Ker rule was later followed in the
1952 Supreme Court case of Frisbie v Collins.
2
1
The first step for the Court was to determine whether the ac-
tions taken by the United States government constituted a viola-
tion of the Extradition Treaty. The Court found that the terms
of the Treaty did not prevent one nation from forcibly abducting
individuals from the other nation. 1 Alvarez contended that to al-
low forcible abduction would frustrate the intent of the Extradi-
tion Treaty.32 Justice Rehnquist read Article 933 to provide the
means of extraditing an individual when the Treaty was actually
invoked.3 4 The Court noted that absent the Extradition Treaty
this procedure for extraditing an individual would not exist.3 5 In
addition, Justice Rehnquist examined the prior practice of the two
nations under the Treaty and determined that such history did not
warrant the finding that a forcible abduction constituted a viola-
tion of the Treaty. 6
The Court next considered Alvarez's claim that general interna-
tional law principles prohibiting forcible abductions should be im-
plied in the Treaty.3 7 Justice Rehnquist refused to accept this ar-
gument stating that only international law principles relating to
28. Id at 444.
29. 342 US 519 (1952). Michigan police officers forcibly abducted the defendant in
Chicago, Illinois, and transported him to Michigan to stand trial. Frisbie, 342 US at 520.
The Court upheld the conviction based on the Ker rule. Id at 522.
30. Alvarez, 112 S Ct at 2193.
31. Id. Alvarez argued that Article 9 of the Treaty impliedly disallowed any forcible
abduction by either nation. Id at 2193-94. Article 9 provides:
1.Neither contracting party shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals, but the
executive authority of the requested party shall, if not prevented by the laws of that
party, have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, if it be deemed proper
to do so.
2.If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the requested
party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecu-
tion, provided that party has jurisdiction over the offense.
Extradition Treaty, 31 UST at 5065.
32. Alvarez, 112 S Ct at 2194. This line of reasoning was adopted by the district
court and court of appeals in their respective decisions. Id.
33. Extradition Treaty, 31 UST at 5065. See note 31 and accompanying text.
34. Alvarez, 112 S Ct at 2194.
35. Id.
36. Id at 2195.
37. Id. Alvarez argued that international abductions so clearly violated international
law that such an action should be viewed as an automatic breach of the Extradition Treaty.
Id.
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"the practice of nations with regard to extradition treaties"3' 8
should be considered in construing the terms of the Extradition
Treaty. 9
In conclusion, the Court stated that due to well-established
practice and precedent it could not infer that the Extradition
Treaty prohibited any and all means of securing jurisdiction over
an individual outside of the express terms listed in the Treaty. 0
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the forcible abduction of Alvarez
did not violate the Treaty; therefore, Ker v Illinois4" fully applied
and the district court had jurisdiction to try Alvarez on all counts
in the indictment. 2 Moreover, Justice Rehnquist noted that the
Mexican government had formally protested the abduction of Al-
varez and concluded that "the decision of whether respondent
should be returned to Mexico, as a matter outside of the Treaty, is
a matter for the Executive Branch.'
43
Justice Stevens dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Black-
mun and O'Connor." Justice Stevens read the Extradition Treaty
as having "been designed to cover the entire subject of extradi-
tion"' 5 between Mexico and the United States."' In so doing, Jus-
tice Stevens gave the specific words and provisions of the Extradi-
tion Treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of
each party to the treaty.'7 This shared expectation was the desire
of the United States and Mexican governments "to cooperate more
closely in the fight against crime and, to this end, to mutually
render better assistance in matters of extradition.' 8 Justice Ste-
vens argued that to permit a nation to forcibly abduct individuals
not extradited robbed the Extradition Treaty of its entire scope
and intent.49
38. Id.
39. Id at 2196.
40. Alvarez, 112 S Ct at 2196.
41. 119 US 436 (1886). For discussion of Ker, see note 27 and accompanying text.
42. Alvarez, 112 S Ct at 2197.
43. Id at 2196.
44. Id at 2197.
45. Id at 2198.
46. Id.
47. Id. In particular, Justice Stevens noted Article 2, Article 9, and Article 22 of the
Treaty. Id. Article 9 requires that the nation requested to deliver one of its citizens must
either extradite or begin prosecution of that individual. Extradition Treaty, 31 UST at 5065.
Cited in note 31. This choice is left to the discretion of the host country under the Treaty.
Id.
48. Alvarez, 112 S Ct at 2198.
49. Id at 2198-99.
1993
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Justice Stevens then applied the reasoning of Rauscher ° to the
case at hand."1 It was "shocking" to Justice Stevens that a party to
an extradition treaty would reasonably believe that it retained a
right to seize residents of the other country when that nation did
not extradite the individual in question.2 Just as the Rauscher
Court denied jurisdiction over the person to the district court, Jus-
tice Stevens contended that the district court should be denied ju-
risdiction over Alvarez due to the violation of the Treaty.*
Justice Stevens proceeded to distinguish the present case from
Ker" and stated that the Ker rule could not be applied to this
case." In concluding, Justice Stevens observed that the majority
totally ignored "customary and conventional international law
principles" ' and its decision "is thus entirely unsupported by case
law and commentary. 6 75 Justice Stevens, therefore, would have af-
firmed the decisions of the district court and the court of appeals.6 8
In order to fully understand the Supreme Court's holding in Al-
varez, it is necessary to review the Court's prior decisions in the
area of forcible abductions of parties outside of the jurisdiction of
a court and the application of related extradition treaties purport-
ing to cover such situations. On December 6, 1886, the United
States Supreme Court decided two cases that established the law
in this area: United States v Rauscher9 and Ker v Illinois.
6 0
In Rauscher, the United States requested the extradition of
Rauscher from Great Britain in accordance With the Treaty of
1842.61 Rauscher was extradited to the United States on the charge
of murder but was indicted by a grand jury for unlawful infliction
50. 119 US 407.
51. Alvarez, 112 S Ct at 2201.
52. Id.
53. Id at 2202-03.
54. 119 US 436.
55. Alvarez, 112 S Ct at 2203. Justice Stevens stated that Ker involved forcible ab-
duction by a person not acting within the U.S. government's authority; however, Alvarez
had been abducted by agents of the United States acting within their authority at the time
of abduction. Id.
56. Id at 2205.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Rauscher, 119 US at 407. For discussion of Rauscher, see note 24 and accompa-
nying text.
60. Ker, 119 US at 436. For discussion of Ker, see note 27 and accompanying text.
61. Rauscher, 119 US at 409. The Treaty of 1842 between United States and Great
Britain, 8 Stat 572, Treaty Ser No 119 (1842), was also known as the Webster-Ashburton
Treaty. Rauscher, 119 US at 407.
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of cruel and unusual punishment.2  The Court was faced with the
issue of whether a person could be tried for an offense other than
that for which he had been extradited."
The Court held that a party can only be tried for the offense
contained in the extradition proceedings under its interpretation of
the Treaty of 1842.64 This holding was based on several writings of
American and 'English legal scholars on the law of nations and ex-
tradition treaties6 5 The Court also considered two statutes passed
by Congress that expressly imposed the doctrine of specialty on
any extradition treaties to which the United States was a party.6
Justice Gray concurred in the decision of the majority only to
the extent that it was based on the two federal statutes imposing
the doctrine of specialty on the treaty.6 7
Chief Justice Waite dissented in the decision." He reasoned that
since the treaty did not expressly provide for the doctrine of spe-
cialty to apply, it should not be applied by the Court. 9 In addi-
tion, Justice Waite stated that once a person is within the jurisdic-
tion of a court, that court must be able to prosecute the party for
62. Id at 409. Rauscher was charged with the murder of second mate Janssen on the
American ship, J.F. Chapman. Id. Rauscher then fled to England to avoid arrest by Ameri-
can authorities. Id at 407. Rauscher was extradited from England to the United States
under the Treaty of 1842 for the charge of murder. Id at 409. Once in America, Rauscher
was put on trial for the charge of cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id at 424. This doctrine is commonly known as the doctrine of specialty. Alvarez,
112 S Ct at 2191. This concept is defined in the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law:
Under most international agreements, state laws, and state practice:
(1) A person who has been extradited to another state will not, unless the requested
state consents,
(a) be tried by the requesting state for an offense other than one for which he
was extradited; or
(b) be given punishment more severe than was provided by the applicable law
of the requesting state at the time of the request for extradition.
(2) A person who has been extradited to another state for trial and has been acquit-
ted of the charges for which he was extradited must be given a reasonable opportu-
nity to depart from that state.
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 477 (1987).
65. Rauscher, 119 US at 415-23.
66. Id at 423-24. The two statutes referred to in the text are Extradition Treaty Stip-
ulations, Pub L No 167, 9 Stat 302 (1848) and Extradition of Criminals, Pub L No 141, 15
Stat 337 (1869). Rauscher, 119 US at 415.
67. Id at 433 (Gray concurring).
68. Id at 434 (Waite dissenting).
69. Id. Chief Justice Waite stated in his dissent that if the doctrine of specialty was
meant to be applied to the treaty then the authors of the treaty would have written it into
the treaty. Id.
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all offenses he has committed in the jurisdiction. 70
The United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in
another important case the same day as its Rauscher decision. A
messenger was dispatched by the President of the United States to
Peru with a warrant to receive Ker from the proper authorities in
Peru in Ker v Illinois.71 This action by President Cleveland was in
compliance with the 1870 treaty72 between the United States and
Peru.73 Upon arriving in Peru, the messenger failed to present the
papers to Peruvian officials, forcibly abducted Ker, and accompa-
nied him back to the United States.74 Ker was indicted, tried, and
convicted in Illinois on the charges of larceny and embezzlement.
7
Ker challenged the jurisdiction of the Illinois court by attempt-
ing to invoke the United States-Peru treaty.76 The argument by
Ker was that a party could not be subject to state or federal juris-
diction if there "was some positive provision of the Constitution or
of the laws of this country violated in bringing him into court,"
77
and that his kidnapping was a violation of the existing extradition
treaty between the countries.78 The Illinois Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower court conviction and denied Ker's jurisdiction
argument.79
The case was then taken to the United States Supreme Court on
70. Id.
71. Ker, 119 US at 438. Ker was a resident of Peru who was charged with larceny and
embezzlement in the criminal court of Cook County, Illinois. Id at 437. President Cleveland
issued the warrant for Ker after the request for extradition made by Illinois Governor Ham-
ilton was denied by Peruvian officials. Id.
72. Treaty with the Republic of Peru, 18 Stat Pt 3 719, Treaty Ser No 283 (1874).
73. Ker, 119 US at 438.
74. Id at 438-39. The reason why the messenger did not present the papers to officials
in Peru is provided by a commentator. John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Ex-
tradition Law, 76 Georgetown L J 1441, 1451 (1988). In the aftermath of a recent revolution
in Peru, the messenger could not locate proper authorities; therefore, he merely kidnapped
Ker. Kester, Myths, 76 Georgetown L J at 1451.
75. Ker, 119 US at 437.
76. Id at 439. The treaty in question was very similar to the treaty disputed in Rau-
scher. Id at 443. The treaty provided Peru the option of extraditing Ker to the United
States voluntarily or waiting until agents of the United States formally demanded Ker's
extradition. Id at 442. However, the treaty did not allow Peru to provide asylum to a crimi-
nal by not delivering that person to the country where the crime was committed when that
country requests extradition. Id.
77. Id at 440..
78. Id. Ker contended that due to the treaty he acquired a right of asylum in Peru
and could only be forcibly removed from that country in accordance with the terms of the
treaty. Id at 441.
79. Id at 439. The Illinois Supreme Court stated that the fact that Ker was brought
to the United States by kidnapping does not invalidate his indictment and conviction in the
criminal courts of that state. Id.
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a writ of error from the Illinois Supreme Court based on the juris-
dictional aspects of the extradition treaty.80 The Court reasoned
that since the messenger did not present the papers he had in his
possession at any time in Peru, the treaty was not called into oper-
ation or relied upon in making the arrest of Ker.18 The Court
found that "the facts show that it was a clear case of kidnap[p]ing
within the dominions of Peru, without any pretense of authority
under the treaty or from the government of the United States."' 2
Finally, the Court held that since the treaty was not invoked in
this case, Ker could not claim rights under that document and the
Illinois state courts had full jurisdiction to prosecute him once he
was physically within that state's borders.83 In its holding, the
Court cited its decision of Rauscher that same day, but differenti-
ated Ker due to the fact that the treaty was not brought into oper-
ation under the facts of Ker as it was in Rauscher.84
The next case considered by the Supreme Court that dealt with
an extradition treaty was Cook v United States, decided on Janu-
ary 23, 1933.85 A Prohibition Era case, Cook involved the confisca-
tion of a British ship by United States Coast Guard officers after
the vessel was searched. 8 The Coast Guard officers found unmani-
fested liquor on board the ship in violation of United States law. 7
In addition to statutory law, the situation was also governed by the
80. Id.
81. Id at 442-43.
82. Id at 443.
83. Id.
84. Id. As stated above, the Court held that the extradition treaty was not brought
into operation due to the lack of reliance on the treaty by the messenger sent to Peru by the
United States. Id. See notes 81-83 and accompanying text. In Rauscher, however, the de-
fendant was extradited to the United States under the extradition treaty between the
United States and Great Britain. See note 62 and accompanying text.
85. 288 US 102 (1933). This case is also known as "The Mazel Toy." Cook, 288 US at
102.
86. Id at 107. The Mazel Toy was searched pursuant to section 584 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, 19 USC § 1584 (1930), as were many other ships during the Prohibition Era. Cook,
288 US at 108. Section 594 of the Tariff Act, 19 USC § 1594 (1930), permitted the Coast
Guard officers to seize any ship containing unmanifested liquor and proceed summarily by
libel to recover the fine assessed upon the ship's master. Cook, 288 US at 108. In the case of
the Mazel Toy, this procedure was followed and libels, or complaints, were filed against both
the vessel and its cargo. Id.
87. Id at 107-08. The United States law provided that all liquor being transported on
a ship within ten miles from the United States coast must be listed on the ship's official
manifest. 19 USC § 1584 (1930). Cook, 288 US at 108. The penalty imposed upon a ship's
master for unmanifested liquor was a fine equal to the value of all liquor that was not in-
cluded on the manifest. Id.
1993
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1924 Treaty between the United States and Great Britain.8 8 This
treaty authorized Coast Guard officers to stop and search vessels
within one hour travel time from the United States coast.89 The
facts in the record indicated that the vessel was boarded at a point
over eleven miles from the United States coast and the maximum
travel speed of the vessel was ten miles per hour.90 Cook argued
that the search and seizure and his subsequent arrest were invalid
due to the provisions of the treaty.91
The district court dismissed the action92 but the circuit court of
appeals vacated and remanded the case back to the district court.8
At that point, the United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari. 4 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the seizure
and arrest under the Tariff Act of 1922 was valid in light of the
conflicting provisions of the Treaty of 1924 with Great Britain.
9 5
The Court held that the action must be dismissed for lack of juris-
diction due to the provisions of the Treaty of 1924.98 The Court
distinguished Ker in that officials of the United States appre-
hended Cook when the United States did not have any authority
to do so under the treaty provisions;97 Ker, however, was seized by
a private party and brought into the jurisdiction of United States
courts by no action of United States officials.98
88. Convention between the United States and Great Britain for Prevention of
Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors, 43 Stat Pt 2 1761, Treaty Ser No 685 (1924).
89. Cook, 288 US at 111.
90. Id at 107-08. The United States contended that it had proper jurisdiction to
search the vessel and arrest Cook due to the Tariff Act of 1922, 19 USC § 1581 (1922). Id at
107. That statute authorized seizures of foreign vessels within four leagues (twelve miles) of
the United States coastline. Id.
91. Id at 109-10. The terms of the treaty explicitly stated that the rights and powers
granted by the treaty "shall not be exercised at a greater distance from the coast of the
United States, its territories, or possessions then can be traversed in one hour by the vessel"
suspected to be carrying unmanifested alcohol. Id at 111 citing 43 Stat Pt 2 1761, Treaty Ser
No 685 (1924).
92. The Mazel Toy, 51 F2d 292 (D RI 1931).
93. The Mazel Toy; United States v Cook, 56 F2d 921 (1st Cir 1932). The circuit
court of appeals held that the treaty did not have the effect of changing the United States
customs-revenue laws which relied on the four league, or twelve miles, zone established by
Congress. Cook, 56 F2d at 923.
94. Cook v United States, 287 US 581 (1932).
95. Cook, 288 US at 107.
96. Id at 122. The Court reasoned that since the ship seized by United States officials
was a British vessel the applicable law was contained in the United States-Great Britain
treaty. Id at 121. The ship was seized in violation of the terms of that treaty therefore the
United States government totally lacked power to seize the vessel and subject its crew to
United States laws. Id at 122.
97. Id at 121.
98. Id.
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Justices Sutherland and Butler dissented Il stating that the pur-
pose and intent of the treaty was not to limit the effect of existing
prohibition statutes.'00 Both Justices would have therefore af-
firmed the decision of the circuit court.
101
The most recent decision by the United States Supreme Court
dealing with this area of law was handed down in 1952 in the case
of Frisbie v Collins.1 " In Frisbie, the Court revisited the issue of
whether a court obtained valid jurisdiction over a person forcibly
abducted and transported against his will into that jurisdiction.103
Collins was forcibly seized in Illinois by Michigan police of-
ficers. 104 After the abduction, Collins was taken to Michigan and
formally arrested on murder charges. 10 5 In reversing the decision of
the court of appeals,'0 6 the Court held that "the power of a court
to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had
been brought within -the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible
abduction.' ,,107 The Ker doctrine was therefore fully upheld by the
Court in rendering its decision in Frisbie.0 8
The majority opinion in United- States v Alvarez-Machain'0 9
correctly stated the legal principles set forth by the Ker" ° and
Frisbie"' cases. Those cases held that a United States court prop-
erly exercises its jurisdictional powers when it indicts and convicts
99. Id at 122 (Sutherland and Butler dissenting).
100. Id. According to the dissenters, the purpose and intent of both countries was to
enlarge any rights of the United States to more effectively enforce its prohibition laws. Id.
101. Id.
102. 342 US 519 (1952).
103. Frisbie, 342 US at 522.
104. Id at 520. Collins was wanted in Michigan for a murder committed in that state.
Id. The Michigan police officers discovered that Collins was living in Chicago, Illinois, and
thereafter forcibly abducted him and transported him to Michigan against his will. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id at 519. The district court denied the writ without a hearing reasoning that the
state court had the power to try a defendant in a criminal action regardless of how his
presence was procured. Id at 520. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded
the case for hearing, Collins v Frisbie, 189 F2d 464 (6th Cir 1951). The court held that the
Federal'Anti-kidnapping Act, 18 USC § 408 (1934), changed the rule applied by United
States courts that proper jurisdiction could be acquired by obtaining the defendant by force.
Collins, 189 F2d at 467-68. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari after the
circuit court of appeals reversed and remanded. Frisbie v Collins, 342 US 865 (1951).
107. Frisbie, 342 US at 522. The Court stated "[t]here is nothing in the Constitution
that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because
he was brought to trial against his will." Id. Furthermore, the Court held that no persuasive
reasons were presented to justify overruling Ker and its progeny. Id.
108. Id.
109. US , 112 S Ct 2188 (1992).
110. 119 US 436 (1886).
111. 342 US 519 (1952).
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an individual brought before the court by means of forcible abduc-
tion as long as the kidnapping was done without any pretense of
authority of the United States government.'12 However, the Alva-
rez majority applied this line of reasoning to the present case
where Alvarez was forcibly abducted and brought to the United
States by the actions of United States DEA agents." 3 The involve-
ment of United States agents in the kidnapping constituted gov-
ernmental activity in violation of the extradition treaty and in vio-
lation of the most basic international law principles. The Court
cannot possibly utilize the Ker doctrine in such a case.
According to the Alvarez decision, the distinction drawn in
Ker'" between a private party acting to kidnap an individual and
the same act being performed by agents of the United States no
longer holds any weight. In addition, the Alvarez Court held that
the acts of the United States agents do not constitute a breach of
the extradition treaty between the United States and the nation
from which the person was kidnapped." 5 This latter holding was
based primarily on the explicit terms of the treaty and discounted
the overall intent of the nations in entering into such an agree-
ment. The intent is to provide a formal mechanism to allow the
transportation of an alleged criminal defendant from one country
to the other country for purposes of trial of that individual. Absent
such an agreement between the nations, there would be no means
available to accomplish this goal.
The United States Supreme Court has left no doubt that it in-
tends to stand behind its decision in Alvarez. On June 22, 1992,
one week after the Court handed down its Alvarez decision, the
Court vacated the court of appeals judgment in United States v
Verdugo-Urquidez,"6 and remanded the case for further consider-
ation in light of Alvarez." 7 Thus, the Supreme Court continues to
hold that the forcible abduction of a person by United States
112. See notes 71-84 and 102-08 and accompanying text.
113. See note 6 and accompanying text.
114. Ker, 119 US at 443.
115. See note 36-42 and accompanying text.
116. 939 F2d 1341 (9th Cir 1991). Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was indicted and
convicted as a party to the kidnap and murder of DEA Special Agent Camarena-Salazar,
along with Alvarez, but in a different action. Verdugo, 939 F2d at 1343. The court of appeals
held that the kidnapping of a Mexican National by agents of the United States violated the
extradition treaty and thereby denied the district court proper jurisdiction to try the de-
fendant. Id. The court reasoned that such an abduction is violative to the whole purpose
and intent of the extradition treaty between the nations. Id at 1349-53.
117. United States v Verdugo-Urquidez, US , 112 S Ct 2986 (1992).
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agents from a foreign nation with which the United States has a
valid, enforceable extradition treaty does not constitute a breach of
the treaty and does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to
try and convict the individual. The international response to this
decision was tremendous. Mexico, along with nearly a dozen Latin
American countries, demanded that the United Nations seek a
World Court ruling on the matter. In the United States, several
civil rights groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union,
expressed similar concerns.
The approach taken by the Alvarez majority blatantly disre-
gards the entire purpose of an extradition treaty. In the Alvarez
dissent, Justice Stevens wisely stated that merely because the
treaty does not explicitly state that the parties must refrain from
forcible abductions of persons in the other nation does not allow or
permit such activity under the treaty."' In addition, Stevens dis-
tinguished Ker and stated that the Ker doctrine cannot be applied
to cases factually similar to Alvarez. The rule in Ker was created
to allow jurisdiction over an individual kidnapped from a foreign
jurisdiction by a private party.1 ' This rule should not be imposed
in cases where the United States government authorizes the abduc-
tion of a person from a foreign nation in violation of an extradition
treaty.
The end result of the Alvarez decision is an extradition treaty
between the United States and Mexico that serves no purpose. The
doors are now open to allow forcible abductions authorized by the
United States in the future, in violation of existing extradition
treaties, and the Supreme Court will follow its decision in Alvarez
and close its judicial eyes to the breach of these agreements. Every
time the United States wants to try a defendant who is residing in
a foreign country with which the United States has an extradition
treaty, the government can send its agents to that nation to kidnap
the individual and forego the procedures set forth in the interna-
tional agreement. Imagine the reaction in the United States if
Mexico or any other nation sent its agents to the United States to
kidnap a private American citizen and take that person back to the
foreign country to stand trial. The response to such an action by
the United States government would surely be fast and furious.
Extradition treaties are created to avoid the exact situations de-
scribed above and which occurred in the Alvarez and Verdugo
118. Alvarez, 112 S Ct at 2199 (Stevens dissenting).
119. See notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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cases. If the Court allows such conduct, the question arises: Why
have an extradition treaty at all? If this is going to be the practice
in the future, Congress should terminate all extradition treaties
and avoid the procedural games presently being played by the
United States Supreme Court.
C. Michael Snyder
